The paper is concerned with Nash equilibrium solutions for the Lighthill-Whitham model of traffic flow, where each driver chooses his own departure time in order to minimize the sum of a departure cost and an arrival cost. Estimates are provided, on how much the Nash solution may change, depending on the cost functions and on the flux function of the conservation law. It is shown that this equilibrium solution can also be determined as a global minimizer for a functional Φ, measuring the maximum total cost among all drivers, in a given traffic pattern. The last section of the paper introduces two evolution models, describing how the traffic pattern can change, day after day. It is assumed that each driver adjusts his departure time based on previous experience, in order to lower his own cost. Numerical simulations are reported, indicating a possible instability of the Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
In this paper we study properties of Nash equilibrium solutions for a model of traffic flow introduced in BH [1] . Car drivers starting from a location A (a residential neighborhood) need to reach a destination B (a working place) all at a given time T 0 . There is a cost ϕ for starting early and a cost ψ for arriving late. Denoting by τ d and τ a respectively the departure and the arrival time of an individual driver, his total cost is thus measured by
(1.1) cost
We assume that each driver can choose his departure time in order to minimize this total cost. A distribution of departure times is called a Nash equilibrium if no driver can reduce his total cost by choosing a different departure time. Of course, in this case all drivers will bear the same total cost.
It is assumed that all cars travel along the same highway. Calling ρ = ρ(t, x) the density of cars at time t at the point x along the road, the Lighthill-Witham model
LW
[9] describes the evolution of ρ in terms of the conservation law
Here v = v(ρ) is a decreasing function, determining how the velocity of cars varies with the density. In a typical setting ( Fig. f:t77
1, left), the flux function ρ → ρv(ρ) is concave down and attains a maximum M = ρ * v(ρ * ) at some value ρ * of the density.
As remarked in BH [1] , it is convenient to write ( Throughout the following, for notational convenience we shall invert the role of the independent variables t, x, and write ( claw2
1.3) in the form
Introducing the integral function U (t, x) . = u(t, s) ds , the conservation law ( claw3 1.7) can be equivalently written as a Hamilton-Jacobi equation
For our model of traffic flow, one should keep in mind that now the x variable denotes time, while t ∈ [0, T ] denotes a specific point on a highway of total length T . Hence U (t, x) measures the total number of cars that have crossed the point t along the highway during the time interval ] − ∞, x].
As initial data for ( Here Q(x) denotes the total number of cars that have entered the queue at the entrance of the highway up to time x, while κ is the total number of departing cars. Being monotone, the function Q is continuous with the possible exception of countably many times x. To fix the ideas, we shall consider the left-continuous version where Q(x) = Q(x−) coincides with its left limit at every x. When needed, we shall denote by Q(x+) = lim y→x+ Q(y) the right limit of Q at x.
For t > 0, the entropy-admissible solution to the Cauchy problem ( hj 1.8) is provided by the Lax formula:
Notice that, since Q(·) is non-decreasing and left continuous, the minimum in ( Lax 1.10) is well defined. As shown in
Indeed, there is a maximum flux M of cars that can enter the highway. If Q is discontinuous, or simply if Q x > M , then a queue is formed at the entrance of the highway. The quantity Q(x) − U (x) measures the length of this queue at time x, while U (x) denotes the total number of drivers that have actually departed (after clearing the queue) up to time x. With the above notations, the map x → U (T, x) describes how many cars have arrived at destination, i.e. at the end of the highway, within time x.
Given a nondecreasing, left continuous initial data Q(·) as in ( Qinfty 1.9), for β ∈ [0, κ[ we define the times x q (β), x d (β), and x a (β) by setting
Here β is a Lagrangian variable labeling a particular driver, x q (β) accounts for the time where this driver joins the queue, x d (β) is the actual departure time (after clearing the queue), and x a (β) is the arrival time. Observe that, for all except countably many β, the above times are uniquely determined by the relations
More generally, if a driver starts at time x, to determine his arrival time we consider two possibilities.
• If there is no traffic at all, then the total time needed for the trip is • On the other hand, if the driver starting at time x encounters traffic, his arrival time will simply be the supremum among the arrival times of all cars departed earlier.
Combining the above cases, the arrival time of a driver who starts at time x is thus defined as
, a Nash equilibrium solution can be defined as follows.
Definition. We say that a bounded, nondecreasing initial data Q(·) satisfying ( Qinfty 1.9) yields a Nash solution of the Cauchy problem ( 
According to (i) all drivers bear the same cost c, while (ii) implies that no one can achieve a cost < c.
For a given total number κ of drivers, the main result in BH [1] established the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium solution. Aim of this paper is to analyze properties of this solution.
• In Section 2 we prove that the Nash equilibrium depends continuously on the cost functions ϕ, ψ and on the speed of cars v = v(ρ). Assuming (without loss of generality) that the total cost to each driver is zero, our main results can be summarized as follows. Given a total number of drivers κ and cost functions ϕ i , ψ i , v i , i = 1, 2, the departure distributions Q 1 , Q 2 of the corresponding Nash equilibria satisfy an estimate of the form
• Section 3 provides a minimax property of the Nash solution. Given any departure distribution Q(·), let Ψ(Q) be the maximum cost among all drivers. For a fixed number of drivers, we show that the Nash equilibrium solution is a global minimizer of the functional Ψ.
• In Section 4 we introduce two evolution equations, modeling how the departure distribution changes from one day to the next. In both cases, the Nash equilibrium corresponds to the unique steady state. The stability of this invariant configuration is a difficult issue, because the evolution equation contains nonlocal terms. Our numerical simulations suggest that the equilibrium configuration may be unstable, while the orbits approach a chaotic attractor.
For future reference, we state the basic assumptions that will be used, on the flux function f in ( 
Moreover, the following limits exist:
(A2) The cost functions ϕ, ψ are continuously differentiable and satisfy
For a review of the extensive literature on mathematical models of traffic flow we refer to GP [4] . See also FKKR, FHM, GHKL, HKK [2, 3, 5, 6] for related optimization problems.
Continuous dependence
In this section we study how the Nash equilibrium changes, depending on the cost functions ϕ, ψ and on the flux f . We always assume that (A1)-(A2) are satisfied.
Given a common cost c, for each x ∈ R, let Λ(x) be the point such that 
By this characterization, the Nash solution is entirely determined by the flux function f and by the map Λ. We also observe that, by replacing ϕ with ϕ − c, it is not restrictive to consider the special case where the common cost to all drivers is zero.
For a given flux function f , it will be convenient to introduce the function h(s) . 
Differentiating the two identities in (
.
. We now write a second order Taylor expansion of the function h at the point −µ, observing that
where
3) and ( h2 2.6), for every ε ≥ 0 we deduce
Given departure and arrival costs ϕ, ψ, as proved in
, the departure distribution Q * (·) for the Nash equilibrium solution where all drivers bear the common cost c = 0 can be obtained as
Here Q 0 is the family of all starting distributions where each driver pays a cost ≤ 0, i.e.
We recall that the starting time x q and the arrival time x a of the β-driver are defined as in ( xqdadef 1.12). Of course, these depend on the overall traffic pattern, hence on the flux function f as well as on Q(·).
Theorem 1 (comparison).
Let Q * (·) be the initial data for the Nash equilibrium solution (with zero total cost to each driver), corresponding to the departure and arrival costs ϕ, ψ and to the flux function f . Similarly, let Q(·) be the initial data for the Nash solution given the costsφ,ψ and the flux functionf . As in ( Lambdadef 2.1), let Λ, Λ be implicitly defined by
2), corresponding to f andf respectively. For the initial data Q(x), the terminal profile U (T, x) with the fluxf is computed by
As in ( xqdadef 1.12), we shall denote byx q (β) andx a (β) the starting time and the arrival time of the driver labelled by β ∈ [0, Q(+∞)].
On the other hand, the terminal profile U (T, x) for the same initial data Q(x) but with flux f is computed by
In this case, the starting time and the arrival time for the driver β ∈ [0, Q(+∞)], will be denoted byx q (β),x a (β), respectively. 
Since Q(·) is the Nash equilibrium solution given the costsφ,ψ and the flux functionf , for almost every β one has the identityx q (β) = Λ(x a (β)). Using ( <L 2.11) and the monotonicity of the map x → Λ(x), for the initial data Q we obtain
Therefore Q(·) ∈ Q 0 and Q(x) ≤ Q * (x) for all x ∈ R .
Remark 2. Since ϕ,φ are strictly decreasing, the inequality ( In this case, Theorem 1 yields an intuitively obvious fact: by increasing the departure and arrival costs and decreasing the speed of cars, the total number of cars in a Nash equilibrium solution (where every driver still pays zero cost) will decrease.
Continuous dependence on the cost functions
Next, we wish to relate two Nash equilibrium solutions with different cost and flux functions, without the assumptions ( is the amount by which one can push up the graph of h(·−x) until it touches the graph of Q(·). Clearly,
Theorem 2. Let the flux function f and the cost functions ϕ i , ψ i , i = 1, 2 satisfy the assumptions (A1)-(A2). Let Q 1 , Q 2 be the starting distributions of the corresponding Nash equilibria. Assume that all drivers in both cases start and arrive within a time interval I = [a, b]. Then there exists a constant C not depending on Q 1 , Q 2 such that
It is clearly not restrictive to assume 0 < ε ≤ 1.
1. Let anyx ∈ [a, b] be given. Our goal is to prove an estimate of the form
for some constant C 0 . For this purpose, we construct two decreasing sequences
according to the following inductive rule. Given x k , consider two cases:
In this case, we choose y k+1 to be the smallest point where the minimum defining U 1 (T, x k ) is attained. More precisely:
We then set
In this case we set y k+1 . = y k − ε and define x k+1 as in ( x+1def 2.18).
The construction terminates when y n ≤ a for some n ≥ 1. Observe that, for some constant c 0 > 0 suitably small, one has either
Therefore the induction must terminate after a finite number of steps. 2. In CASE 1, since y k+1 = Λ 1 (x k+1 ) and h ≤ 0, our construction yields
In CASE 2, by ( h2 2.6) our construction yields
for all y ≤ x k . Since y k − x k > −µ − ε, taking y = y k+1 − ε = y k − 2ε we obtain
Since y n ≤ a, we have Q 2 (y n − ε) = Q 1 (y n ) = 0. Splitting the set of indices I = {1, . . . , n} = I 1 ∪ I 2 according to whether CASE 1 or CASE 2 applies, we obtain
(2.21) est3
3. Since the total number of steps where CASE 2 can occur is ≤ (b − a)/ε, the second summation in ( est3 2.21) is estimated by
We now work toward an estimate of J 1 . By the properties of the function h in ( hdef 2.2), there exists a constant C 1 such that
Define the constant
and choose a suitably small constant 0 < c 2 < M 1 /3C 1 .
Two possibilities need to be considered. If
observing that in CASE 1 we have
On the other hand, if ( ykfar 2.25) fails, then we claim that either k = 0 or else
Indeed, if k ≥ 1, at the previous iteration one has (see fig. f:t69 4)
Using ( ass 2.24) and recalling that c 2 ≤ M 1 /3C 1 , we obtain
We can thus write
On the other hand, by ( h'
2.23) one has
2.27). Together, ( 
2.27) yield the estimate
Inverting the roles of Q 1 , Q 2 one obtains the similar inequality
Denoting by κ an upper bound for both functions Q 1 , Q 2 , we thus conclude
Continuous dependence on the flux function
The main goal of this subsection is to understand how the Nash equilibrium solution changes, if the velocity function
2) is changed. Our main result will be formulated in terms of the inverse of the function h in ( hdef 2.2). More precisely, given a flux function f satisfying the assumptions (A1), for y ≤ 0 we define
Theorem 3. Fix κ > 0 and let the cost functions ϕ and ψ satisfy the assumptions (A2). Let f 1 , f 2 be two flux functions, both satisfying (A1), and let Q 1 , Q 2 be the starting distributions of the Nash equilibria with flux functions f 1 , f 2 , respectively. Assume that in both cases the total number of drivers is κ, and every driver starts and arrives within a time interval I = [a, b], and has zero total cost. Then there exists a constant C not depending on Q 1 , Q 2 such that
Proof. The estimate ( est0f 2.34) will be derived from the bound ( est0 2.14) stated in Theorem 2.
1. Consider the map x → Λ 2 (x), implicitly defined by
By assumption, the initial datum Q 2 yields a Nash equilibrium solution in connection with the flux f 2 , determined by the map Λ 2 (·). We claim that Q 2 also yields a Nash solution in connection with the flux f 1 , for some different costsφ,ψ, and a corresponding map Λ 1 (·).
Indeed, call κ 2 . = Q 2 (+∞). For every β ∈ [0, κ 2 ] let x a 1 (β) be the arrival time of the β-driver, if the starting distribution is Q 2 and the flux function is f 1 . As in ( 
2.2), consider the functions
Observe that, in connection with the same initial distribution Q 2 , if the flux function is f 2 , then the arrival time is x a 2 (β) = sup 
2. For a.e. β ∈ [0, κ 2 ], by assumption we have
We seek new cost functionsφ,ψ, and a map x → Λ 1 (x) such that
Since we are assuming that all drivers depart and arrive within a given time interval [a, b], using ( xa12 2.39) and the identities 
(2.42) L14es The first two factors on the right hand side of ( L14es 2.42) depend only on the cost functions ϕ, ψ. The third factor is estimated by ( xa12 2.39). Using Theorem 2 in connection with the flux function f 2 and the two maps Λ 1 , Λ 2 , we thus obtain To make use of the above theorem, one needs to understand how the distance h
between the two inverse functions can be related to the difference between the flux functions f 1 , f 2 and, in turn, with the difference between the velocity functions v 1 , v 2 in ( claw1 1.2). Up to a linear rescaling of coordinates, it is not restrictive to assume T = 1. In the following, we thus seek to relate the distance
L ∞ between the inverses of the Legendre transforms.
Let v 1 , v 2 be smooth, non-increasing velocity functions such that
Call ρ * i the value where the flux function ρ → ρv i (ρ) attains its global maximum, and let ρ * .
= max{ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 }. Moreover, consider the distance
Let κ > 0 be given. For any s ∈ [0, κ], assume that the Legendre transforms of the corresponding functions
We seek an estimate on |p 1 − p 2 |.
Consider any slope p ≥ p 0 . = max{f 1 (0), f 2 (0)}. Draw the lines with slope p tangent to the graphs of f 1 , f 2 . Call α the distance between the interceptions of these lines with the ρ-axis, and β the distance between the interceptions with the u-axis (see Fig. f:t75 5). Then
Given anyp > p 0 > 0, for all p ∈ [p 0 ,p] we thus have
2.5), consider the minimum of the second derivative
2.45) holds with s = 0, then
More generally, for s ∈ [0, κ] one has the estimate
The right hand side of (
2.45) holds, we thus have
In conclusion, we obtain the estimate
for a suitable constant C 0 . In the setting of Theorem 3, the difference ( est0f 2.34) between the starting distributions in the Nash equilibria with velocity functions v 1 , v 2 can now be estimated by
for a suitable constant C.
A minimax property of Nash equilibria
Fix κ > 0 and let Q κ be the family of all left continuous, nondecreasing functions satisfying (
The next result shows that the Nash equilibrium provides a global minimizer to the functional Ψ.
Theorem 4. If Q * is the initial distribution of the Nash equilibrium solution with a number κ > 0 of drivers, then
Proof. Let Q * ∈ Q κ be the departure distribution for the Nash equilibrium solution with κ > 0 drivers. Let c = Ψ(Q * ) be the common total cost payed by each driver, in the Nash solution. Call Q c the family of all departure distributions (with an arbitrary number of drivers) where each driver pays a total cost ≤ c. As proved in BH [1] , the Nash solution can be characterized as
To prove ( min1 3.2) assume that, on the contrary, there exists another departure distribution Q − ∈ Q κ ∩ Q c−ε , for some ε > 0. By the analysis in
BH
[1], we can then construct a second distribution Q + ∈ Q κ+δ ∩ Q c , for some δ > 0. But this provides a contradiction with (
Remark 3. In general Q * is not the unique global minimizer for the functional Ψ. For example, recalling ( indata2 3.4), consider the initial data
Then the corresponding solution U satisfies U (t, x) = U * (t, x) for all t > 0 and x ∈ R. In particular, for any β ∈ [0, κ], the departure and arrival times of the β-driver satisfỹ
showing that Q ∈ Q κ ∩ Q c also provides a minimizer for the functional Ψ. It is quite possible that Q = Q * . This happens when, in the Nash solution, some of the drivers wait in the queue. By allowing these drivers to depart exactly at timex q (β) = x d * (β), they avoid waiting in line, and hence pay a total cost strictly smaller than c.
Dynamic stability of Nash equilibria
A natural modeling assumption is that Nash equilibria should describe actual traffic pattern. However, a rigorous justification of this claim requires a nontrivial stability analysis. Indeed, assume that on a given day the drivers start their journey at times described by the distribution Q(·). If this is not a Nash equilibrium, on the next day some drivers may decide to change their schedule, starting at a different time, hopefully yielding a lower individual cost. We can thus consider a transformation T : Q(·) → Q(·), describing how the distribution of departure times varies from one day to the next. For some meaningful choice of T we expect that, for any given initial distribution Q(·), the limit of iterates lim n→∞ T n Q should yield the unique Nash equilibrium solution.
Rather than a discrete transformation, we propose here two evolution equations for the distribution Q(·), depending on a continuous parameter s. Assume that the departure rate is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure, so that For each x ∈ R, call y(x) the arrival time of a driver departing at time x. This is implicitly defined by
We also define Φ(x) .
the total cost to a driver starting at time x. It is important to keep in mind that the map x → y(x), and hence Φ(·), depends on the overall traffic distribution, i.e. on u.
Next, consider a one-parameter family of initial data:ū(x, s) = Q x (x, s), depending on the auxiliary parameter s ∈ R + . We seek an evolution equation of the form
for some (possibly non-local) functional Υ, describing how drivers may change their departure time, in an attempt to reduce their total cost. Two choices for the right hand side of ( Model 1. Drivers who initially depart at x continuously modify their departure time, forward or backward depending on the gradient Φ x (x) of the cost. In this case we can take Υ(ū) = (Φ xū ) x and the evolution of the starting distributionū =ū(x, s) is described by the conservation lawū
Model 2. Drivers who depart at time x may decide to jump to a different departure time ξ ∈ R, with probability proportional to the difference in cost. This leads to the integrodifferential evolution equation
In both cases the key issue is whether, as s → +∞, the distribution with densityū(·, s) converges to the initial data of the Nash equilibrium solution.
Numerical simulations
A numerical computation of the Nash equilibrium can be achieved through the necessary condition of the optimal control problem. Let c be the cost for every driver in the Nash solution. We discretize the Lagrangian variable β identifying a particular driver, and set β i = i · δ, for a fixed mesh δ > 0. The departure time x q i = x q (β i ) and the arrival time x a i = x a (β i ) of the i-th driver are computed by the following procedure.
• The first car find no traffic ahead, and travels with maximum speed v(0). The total time needed for the trip is µ, as defined at ( mudef 1.14). The departure time x q 1 of the first car is the smallest root of the equation
This can be found by a secant iterative method. We set
The largest root of the equation ( 
is the arrival time of the β i -driver, if he departs at time x. This root of ( • If for i = N + 1 no solution of ( tc 4.7) is found, then the iteration stops. The value κ(c) = β N = N δ is the total number of cars in the Nash equilibrium solution with common cost c to all drivers.
In a more realistic situation, instead of the cost c one is given the total number of carsκ. In this case, to compute the corresponding Nash solution one needs to invert the map c → κ(c) and find a costc such that κ(c) =κ. This can be done numerically, again using secant iterations. For this purpose, it is found that 4-5 iterations suffice.
In our numerical simulations we consider a highway of length l = 2. The velocity function in ( 
respectively. Figure   fig :NashvsPareto 6 shows the rateū(x) at which cars depart (possibly joining the queue), and total cost Ψ(x) as functions of the departure time. The plots on the left refer to the Nash equilibrium solution, while the plots on the right yields the Pareto optimal solution, where the sum of the costs to all drivers is globally minimized. A detailed analysis of this globally optimal solution can be found in Simulations of the two dynamic models. To simulate Model 1, the conservation law ( dqt 4.3) is solved by a Lax-Friedrichs scheme, satisfying the CFL conditions. To compute the flux Φ u x , we apply a smooth filter (cubic spline), to guarantee that Φ is in C 2 . The eliminates numerical oscillations. The presence of this filter corresponds to a numerical diffusion term, leading to a more stable dynamical system.
To simulate Model 2, the trapezoid rule is used to numerically compute the integral on the right hand side of ( mod2 4.5). The resulting evolution equation is solved with a forward Euler scheme. The time step is chosen small enough so thatū ≥ 0 for all s.
In both cases, we take the Pareto optimal solution as the initial data. As s becomes larger, the profileū(·, s) gets somewhat closer to the departure rate for the Nash equilibrium. However, numerical data do not provide evidence of asymptotic convergence as s → +∞.
Remark. A rigorous analysis of the models ( Here the time step is taken to be ∆s = 0.005, hence a plot after n steps shows a solution of ( 
